主题：A Sugar-Coated Poison Pill? The Performance of Politically Linked Venture Capitalists
主办单位：发展研究院 经济学院 科研处
李文杰，现任台湾政治大学副教授。专长领域为宏观经济理论、公司金融和企业组织理论。已发表重要著作于Journal of Macroeconomics、International Review of Economics and Finance、Academia Economic Papers、Journal of Taiwan Land Research等重要学术期刊。
Investing in young firms is risky. Venture capitalists (VCs) have been syndicating with other competitive VC funds to diversify risk. In this sense, we investigate a new form of venture syndication that ensures that government funds participate in the equity composition of VC. The political link between VCs and the government has long been questioned because of the enormous agency costs embedded in this link. By utilizing a hand-collected Taiwanese venture dataset from the 1980s to the present, the curriculum vitae provided from the fund side and from the start-up venture team allow us to track the degree of educational linkage and political linkage. We thus find that the Taiwanese Development Fund plays a role as a dominant political link within the equity share of new ventures. Our results show that the political link has distorting effects on various levels of new venture performance. It is easier for Development Fund-linked new ventures to achieve IPO status, while politically linked new ventures perform worse than nonpolitically linked firms. Finally, further empirical results show that there is a weak correlation between firm performance and CEO exits in Development Fund-linked ventures. We conclude that management loopholes are the major reason for the underperformance of Development Fund-linked new ventures. These loopholes also explain the high agency costs incurred when managerial levels sidle up to politically linked resources to secure VC investments.