主题：To Merge or to Help Related Firms Merge? Vertical Mergers in Cournot Oilgopolies with Complementary Inputs（合并还是帮助相关公司合并？垂直合并在科诺寡头市场中的互补要素分析视角）

主讲人：台湾政治大学李文杰副教授

主持人：发展研究院 李丁副教授

时间：2019年1月16日（星期四）上午9:00-10:30

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区 格致楼1102会议室

主办单位：发展研究院 经济学院 科研处

主讲人简介：

李文杰，现任台湾政治大学副教授。专长领域为宏观经济理论、公司金融和企业组织理论。已发表重要著作于Journal of Macroeconomics、International Review of Economics and Finance、Academia Economic Papers、Journal of Taiwan Land Research等重要学术期刊。

主要内容：

Consider a successive oligopoly where the production of a final good requires two complementary inputs: one essential input produced by a sole supplier and one generic input by oligopolistic suppliers. We compare the profitability of two kinds of strategies for the supplier of the essential input. One is to help related firms merge vertically and the other is to acquire a downstream firm itself. We show that it is in the interest of the key input supplier to subsidize a fraction of firms in the market to merge vertically when the number of related firms is small. This is because the subsidized mergers can trigger further vertical mergers and lead to the maximum number of pair-wise vertical mergers whereby the monopolistic supplier can grasp the bulk of the efficiency gains stemming from the elimination of double marginalization. In contrast, it is more profitable for the key input supplier to acquire a downstream firm and foreclose the other downstream competitors when the number of related firms is large. This is because now it is less costly for the key input supplier to acquire a downstream firm while it needs to subsidize more firms to achieve full integration.

本文利用互补要素模型分析科诺寡头市场中垂直合并产生的诱因，并讨论模型中存在的各种均衡市场结构。当上游的中间材料由独占厂商生产，另一种情况是由寡占厂商生产时，独占的中间材料生产者的利润会随着垂直合并厂商家数增加而增加。其原因在于垂直合并的厂商消除了双重加价而降低了生产成本，从而增加均衡产量并衍生对独占的中间材料需求。由于独占中间材料厂商可以从其他厂商的垂直并购中获利，它甚至有诱因贴补其他厂商以促成垂直合并，使得产业均衡结构变成完全整合。本文亦支持垂直合并会促进效率的论点，并当有独占劳工工会存在时，厂商进行产业垂直合并后会使得劳工工资上涨。因此本文结果可对反托拉斯法的垂直合并管制提供多元政策意涵，并对多要素投入的垂直相关市场有更全面的市场结构预测。